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INTRODUCTION  
The notion that Chinese economic and diplomatic ties with Africa are motivated by attempts 
to secure access to natural resources (Klare & Volman, 2006), has raised concerns about 
African countries being exposed to new forms of colonialism (Clinton, 2011) and a new 
scramble over their resources (Frynas & Paulo, 2007). Counter-arguments hold that China’s 
own industrial upgrading frees up jobs in export-oriented light manufacturing, which could 
help ignite industrialisation (Lin, 2012). Yet, even this type of engagement could be seen as a 
scramble for African resources, this time labour resources (a ‘scramble for Africans’ 
Meagher, 2016), within the context of a global race to the bottom in terms of labour standards 
and remuneration.  
This paper provides a detailed quantitative and qualitative overview of Chinese official 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) to SSA as well as two in-depth case studies, one on Angola 
and one on Ethiopia. It argues that while flying-geese type relocations of labour-intensive 
industries from China to Africa are can be observed, Ethiopia being one example, Chinese 
investments also support other forms manufacturing production. In fact, the majority of 
Chinese manufacturing investments in SSA come out of, and further support, domestic 
market formation. Even resource-seeking investments are shown to operate with a long time-
horizon. The case of Angola shows that Chinese investments (coupled with Chinese 
construction projects and export demand) contribute to the diversification of an economy 
heavily skewed towards mining activities.  
Whether opportunities in terms of spill-over effects and linkage formation arising from 
economic engagement with Chinese are made use of depends as much on domestic dynamics 
in African countries as on the mode of Chinese engagement. As shown in China’s own 
example, the host country needs to be proactive and channel the inflow FDI in the direction 
for economic transformation. Since the turn of the century China’s “Go Global” policy has 
been instrumental in the expansion of China’s outward FDI. Apart from looking at how “Go 
Global” impacted the African countries, this paper also uses China’s successful 
transformation to “Go Global” as a case to study the role of inflow FDI in economic 
transformation for developing countries. We find that FDI inflow is important for job creation 
and technology transfer, but to capture and utilise the benefits of inflow FDI requires a robust 
and independent industrial policy on part of the receiving country. FDI inflows should be 
used as a tool for structural upgrade empowering capacity building but not creating 
dependency.  
                                                 
1 We recognize that many research papers on China’s FDI will include trade, contracted projects and even aid. 
This paper only focuses on the official FDI. For details of China-Africa trade and contracted projects, please see 
our other papers specific for trade (Wolf, forthcoming) and contracted projects (S.-K. Cheng & Wolf, 
forthcoming).  
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1. CHINESE FDI IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A QUANTITATIVE AND 
QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT 
1.1. CHINESE FDI TO SSA: A QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
Data sources and sources of discrepancies  
Chinese FDI figures have been claimed to be unreliable – but this is a general problem of FDI 
figures and not specific to Chinese data. Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to an 
investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of 
the investor (IMF, BMP5). A long-lasting interest, in turn, is defined as the attempt to gain an 
effective voice in the management of the enterprise. A 10% equity ownership is applied in the 
definitions of the IMF and the OECD as a threshold for effective voice in the management of 
the foreign enterprise (OECD, 2008 BD4; IMF, 1993 BMP5) 
Similar to trade data, FDI are bilateral flows and recorded by the home country as outflows 
and the host country as inflows. Yet, the two accounts hardly ever match, because, despite the 
clear definition of what constitutes FDI, the measurement of FDI is inherently difficult. 
Firstly, the components of FDI are equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital 
(mainly intra-company loans). Data on reinvested earnings depends on the collection of 
company survey data because reinvested earnings do not involve foreign exchange 
transactions and therefore do not figure in the central banks’ statistics on cross-border 
financial flows. This is especially a problem for data reported from developing countries, 
which often relies exclusively on the foreign exchange records of the central banks.  
Secondly, there might be mismatches between stocks and flows reported. The only accurate 
source for stock data to account for changes in valuation due to deprecation and reinvested 
earnings are company surveys. Yet, in the absence of extensive company survey data, stocks 
are often approximated from the cumulative flows obtained through foreign exchange 
records, which can considerably under- or overestimate existing stocks. This problem 
becomes apparent in the case of Angola, where cumulative flows reported by the central bank 
(BNA) amount to negative stocks since 2013. 
Thirdly, data on the sectoral composition of FDI are extremely limited if FDI records derive 
primarily from the international transaction records. Some countries have periodic census or 
benchmark surveys to complement information on the sectoral composition. In some 
countries, such as the Australia, Canada or the United States, these even constitute the main 
sources of FDI information. In developing countries, however, sectoral information on 
foreign investment is often limited to information provided the national investment 
promotion agencies. This introduces new sources of uncertainty, because not all FDI may be 
registered with the investment promotion agency. It is possible that only new investment 
projects are recorded (not reinvested earnings), projects might be miss-classified to benefit 
from additional investment incentives in certain sectors and data may only cover approved 
projects rather than actually implemented projects. 
In addition, the industrial classification used by different national bodies does not always 
match and the industrial classification used may be based on either the primary activity of the 
parent company, or the primary activity of the affiliate. Exceptions are found in the German 
and United States FDI data, which are compiled in accordance with both of those criteria. In 
most countries, outward FDI is classified according to the industry of the parent company, 
while inward FDI is attributed to the industry of the foreign affiliate in the host economy. 
3 
 
Fourthly, equity capital, as well as changes in intra-company loans between parents and 
affiliates, and reinvested earnings tend to fluctuate considerably between years and may be 
substantially revised subsequently. Although there may be attempts to revise the FDI flow-
data series accordingly, it can be difficult to attribute revisions to particular previous years. 
For that reason, proper adjustments are normally made only at the time of comprehensive 
surveys. Surveys also allow for a revaluation of assets which helps to ensure a more accurate 
assessment of investment stocks. 
Fifthly, the geographical distribution of FDI flows is difficult to establish because of 
increasingly complex ownership structures of multinational companies and because the 
ultimate beneficial owner can be hidden if investments are channeled through holding 
companies in offshore tax havens such as Panama, Bermuda or the Cayman Islands. Survey 
data can reduce this problem if it distinguishes between immediate and ultimate owners of the 
offshore holding company (the latter being often the parent country itself). 
Considering all these issues in the collection and measurement of FDI data, information is not 
fully comparable across countries and likely involves a considerable error margin. This is 
particularly so for inflows to developing countries, because records often rely exclusively on 
the foreign exchange records of the central banks. In theory, inflows to developing countries 
can also be approximated through the records on outflows from the home countries. But this 
will only be meaningful for home country entities who provide data on outflows relying on 
complementary periodical enterprise surveys. This means that while more accurate data 
might be obtained through outflows from countries with advanced statistical records, total 
inflows can be derived from the home country data, which makes it difficult to get an 
accurate sense of the relative shares of different foreign investors. Also, FDI data between 
different developing countries is particularly hard to track.  
Data on FDI outflows from China follow the guidelines set by the OECD and derive from 
company records of the Ministry of Commerce. Records of foreign assets include all 
components of FDI, crucially also covering reinvested earnings (China Statistical Bulletin on 
Outward FDI). Outflows reported by China are therefore likely to be comparable to outflows 
reported by the major OECD economies. 
This paper relies on FDI outflows reported by China as well as the major OECD investors in 
Africa, i.e. the US, France, Italy and Portugal. For the case studies on Angola and Ethiopia, 
the paper also draws on data reported by the national investment authorities. While levels 
might be inconsistent across different data sources, this serves at least to discern common 
trends across different data sources as well as the error margins itself. 
Seen from the Chinese perspective, outward FDI flows and stocks to Sub-Saharan African 
countries remain marginal, with OFDI flows to SSA increasing in absolute terms but barely 
relative to other regions: FDI stocks in SSA make up for 1.8% of total FDI stocks in 2004, 
and 3.7% in 2013. In absolute terms, Chinese FDI stocks in SSA increase from USD 780 
million in 2004 to USD 20.3 billion in 2013 (excluding South Africa; Source: Statistical 
Bulletin of Chinese Outward FDI). The vast majority of Chinese outward FDI goes to Asian 
countries (USD 447 billion in 2013), the fastest growing market is Europe and North 
America (Graph 1). 
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Graph 1. Chinese OFDI stocks by region 2004-2013 (current USD, millions) 
 
These seemingly small figures need to be put into perspective. Pairault (2014) points out that 
the large volumes of Chinese OFDI to Asia are mainly investments to Hong Kong used by 
mainland firms for ‘round tripping’, i.e. outward flows to Hong Kong to benefit both from 
incentives for outward FDI followed by reinvestment to the mainland to benefit from 
investment incentives for inward FDI. Investments to other tax havens like the Cayman 
Islands, in turn, might obscure investment flows to third countries. Because it is impossible to 
trace the actual investment destinations through tax havens, Pairault (2014) proposes to look 
at the non-tax haven investments only.  
Following the definition of tax havens deployed by Hines and Rice (1994), Table 1 shows 
Sub-Saharan Africa is actually the third largest investment destination of non-tax haven 
bound outward FDI.  
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Table 1. Chinese FDI stocks by region and tax region in 2013 ($ million) 
Total OFDI stocks 658,707 
 tax havens total 480,450 % of tax haven total 
 
Hong Kong, China 377,093 78.5% 
 
Cayman Islands 42,324 8.8% 
 
British Virgin Islands 33,903 7.1% 
 
Other 27,130 5.6% 
    
non-tax haven total 178,257 % of non-tax haven total 
 
OECD 84,324 47.3% 
 
Asia 40,403 22.7% 
 
SSA 19,006 10.7% 
 
BRICS 16,163 9.1% 
 
MENA 9,739 5.5% 
 
Latin America (excl. OCED) 6,894 3.9% 
 
Oceania 1,000 0.6% 
 
Europe (excl. OECD) 728 0.4% 
Calculations based on Statistical Bulletin of Chinese Outward FDI 
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While China has invested in 52 out of 60 African countries (86.7%), nearly 90% of FDI are 
concentrated in 21 countries. Both Angola and Ethiopia are among the top 10 destinations of 
Chinese outward FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2013 (Angola ranking 3rd, Ethiopia 10th). 
Angola accounts for 8% of total FDI stocks of Chinese firms in SSA (excluding South 
Africa) and Ethiopia for 3.8%. Chinese FDI stocks in Angola amount to USD 1.6 billion in 
2013 and are considerably higher than in Ethiopia (USD 771 million in 2013) (Table 2). This 
partially mirrors the global distribution of FDI in SSA. Some of the top SSA recipients of 
FDI also rank high in terms of total Chinese FDI stocks, e.g. Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana and 
Zambia and Angola. Angola used to be the second largest recipient of FDI in SSA up until 
2010. Since then, the Angolan Central Bank (BNA) started to record large outflows of FDI, 
which by 2013 had cumulated to negative stocks. This is likely to understate total Angolan 
FDI stocks (see methodological issues above). In fact, total FDI out-stocks in Angola 
reported by the major OECD investors and China amount to USD 25 billion in 2012, which 
makes Angola one of the largest recipients of FDI, second only to Nigeria (USD 76 billion 
according to inflow records). 
Table 2. Top destinations of Chinese OFDI stocks in SSA in 2013, current USD million 
Country FDI stock China 
2013 
% of total Chinese 
FDI in SSA 
Rank FDI China Rank FDI total 
Zambia 2164.32 10.9% 1 8 
Nigeria 2146.07 10.8% 2 1 
Angola 1634.74 8.2% 3 *** 
Zimbabwe 1520.83 7.6% 4 25 
Sudan 1507.04 7.6% 5 2 
Congo, DR 1091.76 5.5% 6 15 
Lesotho 913 4.6% 7 40 
Mauritius 849.59 4.3% 8 20 
Ghana 834.84 4.2% 9 4 
Ethiopia 771.84 3.9% 10 13 
Source: Statistical Bulletin of Chinese Outward FDI and UNCTAD FDI Statistics 
Other countries, such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Mauritius and Ethiopia, figure among the top 
10 recipients of Chinese FDI but actually rank low in terms of total SSA FDI stocks, which 
indicates that China makes up for an important part of total investments in these countries.  
Seen from the African perspective, Chinese FDI not only grow quickly but also constitute an 
important source of investment. Comparing total FDI stocks of SSA countries reported by 
UNCTAD with total Chinese FDI stocks in SSA countries reported in the Statistical Bulletin 
of Chinese Outward FDI, shows that in 2013, Chinese FDI stocks account for approximately 
6.5% of total FDI stocks in SSA (Table 3). As laid out above, information on shares has to be 
interpreted with care because total FDI records are derived from inflows data reported by the 
SSA countries, while information on the individual reporters comes from the outflows 
records of the reporters itself.  
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Table 3. FDI stocks in SSA (excl. South Africa) by investor (current USD million) 
Reporter 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
France 10,009 17,907 18,987 23,763 25,798 25,975 28,668 n.a. 
USA 10,051 10,891 12,587 18,038 24,805 25,005 25,394 n.a. 
China 1,928 3,061 3,903 5,696 7,298 10,292 14,651 19,919 
Portugal 1,282 1,787 4,212 3,388 4,479 5,291 6,227 n.a. 
Italy 0 813 1,459 1,740 1,426 1,402 251 n.a. 
SSA total 122,441 145,541 166,724 198,537 221,533 252,641 282,779 314,846 
China % of SSA 
total 1.57% 2.10% 2.34% 2.87% 3.29% 4.07% 5.18% 6.33% 
What is more, (W. Chen, Dollar, & Tang, 2015) point out that in absolute terms, China’s 
stocks in Africa are on par with those of the major OECD countries. China’s FDI stocks in 
SSA (excluding South Africa) amount to USD 19 billion in 2013 compared to USD 25.4 
billion of the US and USD 28.6 billion of France in 2012 respectively (Table 3). 
However, considerable variation across SSA economies can be observed when comparing 
Chinese FDI flows relative to gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), ranging from 29% of 
GFCF in Zimbabwe to -0.3% in Rwanda in 2013. The median of Chinese FDI as a ratio to 
GFCF in SSA economies is 1.01%, the average 2.45%. Angola and Ethiopia can be found 
somewhere in the middle, with Chinese FDI amounting to 1.3% in Angola and 0.7% in 
Ethiopia (Graph 2).  
Graph 2. Chinese OFDI flows as % of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (2013) 
 
1.2. CHINESE FDI TO SSA – A QUALITATIVE PESPRECTIVE: BETWEEN FLYING 
GEESE AND RESOURCE COLONIALISM? 
In SSA countries, the ratios of FDI to Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) are high 
compared to world and developing country averages. Table 4 shows that FDI flows amount 
to 16.1% of GFCF in the period 2008-2014, which is considerably above world and 
developing country average (9.2% and 10% respectively).  
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Table 4. FDI flows as share of GFCF 
 
1990-1999 2000-2007 2008-2014 
World 6.9 10.4 9.2 
Developed countries 6.5 9.6 8.2 
Developing countries 8.7 12.2 10.0 
SSA (excl. S. Africa) 11.0 18.2 16.1 
Source: UNCTADstat 
This suggests that SSA countries are relatively successful in attracting FDI inflows, but less 
so in stimulating domestic investment and linkage formation. The question therefore is not 
just about the order of magnitude of Chinese FDI but also about the nature and investment 
motives of Chinese firms, which will determine linkage formation and spill-over effects.  
There are a number of hypotheses why Chinese investment might actually support linkage 
formation and crowding-in of investments, including the smaller technology gap and 
therefore better possibility for absorption of positive spill-over effects from South-
South/Chinese investments (Amighini & Sanfilippo, 2014) or the lesser degree of 
financialisation of Chinese firms which could positively impact on the time-horizon of 
investments (Lo, Wenzhe, & Lixia, 2011). The exact causal relations between Chinese 
investments and technological spill-over effects will have to be established on a case by case 
basis but there are a number of stylized characteristics of Chinese investments worth pointing 
out at the aggregate level, which include the strong degree of state-guidance of investments 
through China’s “Go Global” policy and the market-seeking nature of manufacturing 
investment. 
State-directed FDI: China’s go global and the implications for the nature of Chinese 
investments in Africa 
Chinese outward FDI needs to be understood in relation to China’s own industrial policy, 
which, in turn, has implications for the nature of Chinese OFDI in Africa in terms of 
ownership structures and the sectoral composition of investments. 
“Go Global” or “Go Out” (zou chu qu走出去) was first introduced in China’s Tenth Five-
year Plan in 2001. A key target of this Five-year Plan was “making significant progress in 
establishing a modern enterprise system in state-owned enterprises, improving the social 
security system and taking part in international economic cooperation and competition 
extensively and in depth” (China.org.cn, 2014). The “Go Global” policy is thus a milestone 
of the Market Reforms, which hitherto emphasized the utilization of foreign capital inside 
China. Indeed outward foreign investments had been tightly controlled by the government 
even after the Market Reforms in 1978 and were only gradually liberalized in late 1980s and 
1990s. The government actually tightened the approval procedures for overseas ventures in 
the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 before consolidating the “Go Global” 
strategy in 2004 (Salidjanova, 2011, p. 5).   
Under the speech title Doing a better job in opening to the outside world in the light of 
economic globalization outlining this Five-year Plan, Premier Zhu Rongji (Zhu, 2001) put 
China’s entry into the WTO in the same paragraph with the “Go Global” policy.  
“We need to implement a ‘going outside’ strategy, encouraging enterprises with 
comparative advantages to make investments abroad, to establish processing 
operations, to exploit foreign resources with local partners, to contract for 
international engineering projects, and to increase the export of labor. We need to 
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provide a supportive policy framework to create favorable conditions for enterprises 
to establish overseas operations. We also need to strengthen supervision and prevent 
the loss of state assets.”  
The 2004 State Council Decision on Reforming the Investment System codified the “Go 
Global” policy with concrete guidelines and targets. State-owned enterprises were now given 
greater decision-making powers and only government-funded capital projects required state 
approval (State Council, 2004). The joint guidelines published by the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the China Exim-Bank in October 2004 promoted 
outward direct investment in four types of projects: i) exploitation of resources which are 
scarce domestically; ii) manufacturing and infrastructure projects which encourage the export 
of domestic technologies, products, equipment and labour; iii) overseas R&D centres which 
can attract advanced technologies, management experience and professional personnel; iv) 
mergers and acquisitions which can enhance international competitiveness and rapidly 
develop overseas markets (NDRC & CHEXIM, 2004).  
The double-digit economic growth since the reform era has also led to a high demand for 
external resources and technology to further the development plan. The massive foreign 
reserve holdings are managed by the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and 
are mostly invested in US Treasury bonds. The China Investment Corporation, created in 
2007 as China’s official sovereign wealth fund, had major paper losses in its first few 
investments in US investment firm Blackstone and investment bank Morgan Stanley and was 
subject to fierce criticism by the Chinese public and government (Salidjanova, 2011, p. 14). 
The need for diversifying investment and further economic development makes “Go Global” 
a sensible move from the China’s perspective. One of the major differences between China 
and those countries being subject to the imposition of neoliberal reform is that China did not 
suffer from debt or currency crises and therefore did not rely on loans from the IMF or the 
World Bank. China seems to have the “luxury” to participate in the global economy relatively 
on its own terms despite of international pressure.  
Various state agency are involved in fostering overseas investments which includes 
(Salidjanova, 2011, p. 13): 
i. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)  
ii. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
iii. Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)  
iv. State banks including China Export-Import Bank which provide loans to 
enterprises 
v. The China Development Bank and the China Export & Credit Insurance 
Corporation which provide support with risk assessment, insurance and protection 
against currency fluctuations in the host country 
vi. Chinese embassies which provide support in feasibility studies for investment 
projects 
vii. Provincial officials who can approve foreign investments of less than US$3 
million  
“Go Global” is very much a state-led project with the primary aims and objectives to 
strengthen the economic position and development of China itself. However, the policy is 
also used for political and strategic purposes in building South-South cooperation in areas 
outside of immediate economic gains. It is worth noting that Africa is the only region in 
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which ‘construction’ and ‘scientific research and technical services’ figure among the top five 
sectors of Chinese OFDI stocks (2014 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment).  
The China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation White Paper published by the State 
Council (Chinese State Council, 2013) dedicated two chapters to Supporting African 
Infrastructure Construction and Stressing African People’s Livelihoods and Capacity 
Building. The Chinese government recognizes the importance of infrastructure construction 
as a starting point for any improvement in the investment environment and people’s 
livelihoods. It “encourages enterprises and financial institutions to participate in African 
infrastructure construction, including transportation, communications and electric power 
projects, in a variety of different ways” (Chinese State Council, 2013, Chapter IV). The huge 
jump of Chinese FDI in construction in just three years has shown that the directives in the 
White Paper are not just talk but followed up by action. 
In fact, mining- and construction-related investments make up for a high share of Chinese 
OFDI in Africa. The two sectors account for 49.2% of total stocks in Africa in 2014. What is 
noteworthy, however, is that the share of mining-related investments actually falls (i.e. grows 
less quickly than other types of investments), falling from a high of 30.6% in 2011 to 24.5% 
in 2014. The share of mining-related activities in Chinese OFDI is actually below the global 
level, with mining accounting for as much as 35% of total FDI to SSA in 2012 (UNCTAD, 
2015). The relative decline of mining-related investments is explained by the rise of 
construction-related investments, which, by the end of 2014, overtakes mining in China’s 
OFDI stock in Africa (Graph 3; MOFCOM 2015, 109). In terms of flows, mining-related 
investments come only 4th in 2014 after construction, transportation/storage/postal service 
and manufacturing. In 2014, Chinese OFDI flows to construction in Africa are over USD 759 
million which is about USD 340 million more than the flows to mining (MOFCOM, 2015, 
99). This comparatively strong focus on construction investments has implications for the 
type of spill-over effects. Construction-related FDI together with Chinese overseas contracted 
projects drive linkage formation to the manufacturing sector. Ethiopia and Angola, for 
instance, become the 3rd and 4th largest producers of cement in SSA after Nigeria and South 
Africa over the course of the decade (S.-K. Cheng & Wolf, forthcoming) 
Graph 3. Sectoral Distribution of Chinese FDI to Africa by selected years (% of total stocks) 
 
Although the “Go Global” strategy pledges support for “enterprises of all ownership types”, 
in reality it is the “national team” of state-owned enterprises, which successfully goes global. 
As shown in the recent Global 500, most of the Chinese companies listed are state-owned. 
The top 12, out of the total 98 China based companies, are state-owned (Cendrowski, 2015). 
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This is mirrored in the ownership structures of Chinese OFDI stocks, with SOEs accounting 
for more than 53% of China’s OFDI in 2014 (Graph 4; MOFCOM, 2015). 
Graph 4. Proportion of State-owned enterprises and Non-state enterprises in China's 
Outward FDI Stock 2006-2014 
 
Existing evidence shows that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) invest in longer-term 
and higher-risk infrastructure projects, which are usually refused by private enterprises 
(Poon, 2014). China’s continuous and increasing growth of outflow FDI at the time of global 
recession in 2008, with a year-on-year growth rate of OFDI flow in 2008 of 110.9%2 is a 
very noticeable difference to the global trend (W. Tang & Pigato, 2015, 10). 
The proportion taken by non-state enterprises has been increasing; from 19% in 2006 to 
46.4% in 2014 (Graph 4). As the SOEs are mainly in the construction and mining sectors, the 
increasing number of Chinese private enterprises and manufacturers in Africa (W. Tang & 
Pigato, 2015) may signify a division of labour between the state and private sectors of China 
in outward investment – after the SOEs built the infrastructure for economic activities, the 
private sector then follows. Some Chinese firms are willing to incur short-term losses in order 
to become more cost-effective or to penetrate the domestic consumer market.  
The market-seeking and long-terms oriented nature of Chinese FDI and government 
guidance of investment 
Available evidence suggests that a substantial part of Chinese FDI is in manufacturing, which 
has a high potential for productivity growth, and is also predominately market-seeking and/or 
long-term oriented. In 2014, 13.6% of Chinese FDI stocks in Africa are in manufacturing 
activities (Graph 3, pg 10). This is below the global distribution of all FDI to SSA countries 
in which manufacturing accounts for 20% in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2015). As outlined above, this 
is mainly explained by the exponential rise of construction-related investments dominated by 
SOEs. Manufacturing sector investments amount to as much as 31% of Chinese private FDI 
in 2013 (Shen, 2015). Chinese manufacturing investments are not limited to resource-rich 
                                                 
2 Even if to exclude the $5.6 billion purchase of 20 percent share in South Africa’s Standard Bank the FDI level 
would remain constant during 2008-09 
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countries, examples include sugar refineries in Mali, glass and automobile factories in 
Ethiopia or textile and steel plants in Uganda (People’s Republic of China, 2013). 
One (frequently discussed) factor that might countervail the displacement of African light 
manufacturing exports is the potential relocation of labour-intensive industries from China to 
SSA due to rising labour costs in China (Zoellick 2010; Lin 2012). The World Bank Study on 
Light Manufacturing in Africa for instance is optimistic that this rise in labour costs in China 
could “jump-start Sub-Saharan Africa's structural transformation in the near future” seeing 
that “it is well endowed with inexpensive, low-skilled labor, a key ingredient in the initial 
industrialization of a long list of Asian economies.” (Dinh, Palmade, Chandra, & Cossar, 
2012)  
Tang (2014) finds that while local apparel producers in the traditional apparel production 
bases in South-Eastern Africa suffer from Chinese and Asian competition, Chinese 
investments bring advanced technology and management techniques to this sector, which 
help the survival of local producers in market segments such as fast fashion, uniforms and 
work wear. However, most investments in apparel production remain small to medium in 
scale, with a few exceptions such as the China JD group in Tanzania and the Huajian shoe 
factory in Ethiopia (X. Tang, 2014).  
Whether large-scale relocations such as China JD and Huajian will become a widespread 
trend remains unclear. Ozawa & Bellak (2011) argue that China is far from having reached 
the “Lewis turning point” (or period): there are an approximate 160 million Chinese rural 
migrants plus 70 million potential more migrants. All in all, 750 million Chinese live in the 
countryside where wages are one third below their urban counterparts. The Chinese 
government undertook massive rural infrastructure development and economic stimulus 
programmes with the aim of encouraging the relocation of industries to the hinterland. Also, 
none of the multi-nationals that drive China's labour-intensive export sector has shown any 
sign of relocating their activities to Sub-Saharan Africa, though some moved to the hinterland 
or nearby countries (e.g. Foxconn relocated 200,000 jobs to the cheaper inland provinces) 
(Ozawa & Bellak, 2011).  
Even existing investments in export-oriented light manufacturing face problems. Most 
Chinese SME investments in apparel focus on cutting, making and trimming, and packing 
operations, which have low capital requirements. Moving costs being low, these firms often 
go after subsidies or even cheaper (labour/production) costs and therefore have a tendency to 
relocate very quickly rather than sustaining a lasting production base. Very large-scale 
apparel investments might base investment decisions on more long-term rationales. For 
instance, the investment by the China JD Group in Tanzania, which employs about 28,000 
workers in Asia and about 1,000 in Tanzania, accepted losses for the first years of the plants 
operation to gain experience in the local market (X. Tang, 2014).  
More fundamentally, flying-geese type relocations of labour-intensive export-oriented 
industries cannot prompt industrialisation evenly across and within countries, unless they are 
coupled with domestic market formation. Driven by the search for cheap labour, these flying-
geese investment patterns reflect systems of hierarchical production and investment, in which 
competitive pressure on labour (in peripheral and core countries) intensifies while the 
technological and financial core remains under control of capital in developed countries 
(Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 1998). With investments following a logic of primitive 
accumulation, for countries at the rear end of the flying geese formation, productivity 
increases are not fast enough to reach knowledge- and research-intensive activities that would 
generate high incomes. At the same time, under-consumption problems arise as the incomes 
generated by this type of industrial activity are too low to sustain production for the domestic 
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market (Lo 2011; Lipietz 1982). In this context, intense price and wage competition between 
developing countries supplying highly substitutable products to the world market causes a 
race to the bottom. The terms of trade for low value-added manufacturing products are 
declining (Sarkar and Singer 1991; Kaplinsky and Farooki 2012) and the concurrent attempt 
of each country to boost its competitiveness through wage depression further undercuts a 
vital source of domestic purchasing power and contributes to the deflation in world demand 
(Razmi & Blecker, 2008). 
Existing evidence shows that Chinese investments often come out of and act in support of 
domestic market formation, which suggests that Chinese investments can further other forms 
of economic diversification as well. In particular, Chinese investments have been shown to be 
primarily market-seeking and/or long-term oriented. Qualitative firm-level evidence suggests 
that more than half of private sector-led Chinese FDI is attracted by the large domestic 
markets of African countries (Shen, 2015). This is confirmed by Gu (2011) who finds that the 
most frequently mentioned motives of Chinese firms to move to Africa are accessing the 
local market and intense competition in China, as well as Warmerdam and Dijk (2013), who 
for the Ugandan case find that domestic market potential was the main reason to invest in 
Uganda and that, in fact, none of the companies interviewed was interested in selling to the 
global market from their Ugandan base. Similarly, 12 out of 16 firms interviewed by Huang 
& Ren (2013) said their investment in South African was market-seeking.  
Chinese investments often follow a rise in import tariffs on consumer goods, making 
relocation a more profitable way to penetrate the local market than exporting (Shen, 2015: 
98). For instance, three of the twelve market-seeking firms interviewed by Huang & Ren 
(2013) specifically indicated that they wanted to avoid tariff barriers. Similarly, in the 
Nigerian case the rise of trade volumes alerted Chinese consumer goods manufacturers to the 
market potential in Nigeria. The rise in import tariffs on numerous goods in 2004 then 
prompted Chinese manufactures of furniture and textiles who had previously exported to 
Nigeria to look for alternative ways to penetrate the Nigerian market, namely by relocating 
production to Nigeria. This has triggered wider spill-over effects. The ban of Chinese 
consumer goods also incentivises former Nigerian traders to set up manufacturing plants and 
the employment of Chinese workers had productivity-enhancing demonstration effects 
among the domestic workforce (Mohan & Lampert, 2013). Spill-over effects of the Nigerian 
tariff scheme even extent to supply chain formation. By 2009, a number of Chinese shoe 
manufactures had moved their assembly lines to Nigeria and actively inquired the possibility 
of producing inputs (namely rubber soles) locally (Brautigam & Tang, 2014). The venture 
eventually failed due to financial troubles affecting the parent company in China, but this 
policy induced process of chain migration and investment reveals something interesting about 
the relation between trade and domestic market formation: Chinese manufacturers are only 
alerted to the sales potential of Nigerian market through the high volumes of import demand 
from African traders. The decision to relocate production to Nigeria is a direct consequence 
of changes in the Nigerian tariff structure.  
Other than market-seeking manufacturing investment, Chinese FDI in SSA are attracted by 
natural resource wealth. In fact, 68% of Chinese OFDI stocks in SSA are in resource-rich 
countries (calculations based on China Statistical Bulletin of Outward FDI 2013). 3  Yet, 
Chinese FDI follows the global pattern in terms of seeking natural resource wealth. The 
coefficients for resource wealth as explanatory variables for the spatial distribution of FDI 
flows in Africa are in fact similar for Chinese and overall FDI (W. Chen et al., 2015). What is 
                                                 
3 Following the definition of the IMF, i.e. countries whose exports of non-renewable primary commodities 
account for more than 25% of total export revenues. 
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more, even Chinese investments in mining and construction have been shown to take a long-
term strategic view either to penetrate the African construction market for market outlets (C. 
Chen & Orr, 2009) or to secure access to raw materials. For instance, being more interested 
in the use value than in the market value of copper, Chinese SOE’s have bought the worst 
performing mine in Zambia that could not attract any investors after privatisation and lay idle 
for 13 years because the mine was still more profitable than copper mines in China. 
The market-seeking and long-term oriented nature of Chinese investments has implications 
for the business strategies and practices of Chinese firms. For instance, the response to the 
first slump in copper prices early 2009 illustrates the different accumulation logics of Chinese 
and other foreign firms. To protect their short-term financial interests, all mines listed in the 
London Metal Exchange reacted to the market fluctuation by laying off workers and freezing 
wages. By contrast, the Chinese-owned mine maintained production, staff and wage levels 
(Lee, 2014). Given their long-term and territorially specific interest in copper production, this 
business model has also been shown to be more sensitive to demands of workers  (Lee, 
2009). 
For market-seeking investors training of local staff and their promotion into managerial 
positionsnot only aims to draw on the expertise of the local business environment, but also 
reflects Chinese firms’ efforts to establish a good brand reputation within the host country. 
For instance, in the telecommunication sector, ZTE and Huawei try to establish themselves as 
providers of price-leading, yet reliable and high-quality products in the African market before 
venturing into Europe and North America. Building a good corporate image is part of this 
wider effort to establish brand reputation. In Africa, this involves various CSR practices but 
also training and promotion of host country nationals into managerial positions (Cooke, 
2012). In Uganda, for instance, ZTE has explicit localisation targets where 70% of 
managerial positions and 100% of lower level positions are to be filled with Ugandan 
nationals (Warmerdam & van Dijk, 2013). 
Evidence of spill-over effects from Chinese investments 
While Elu & Price (2010) find no evidence for productivity-enhancing effects of Chinese 
investments in Africa, more recent econometric evidence finds positive correlations between 
Chinese/South-South FDI and export-diversification in African countries, especially in low-
tech sectors such as agro-processing and textiles and apparel production (Amighini & 
Sanfilippo, 2014). Contrary to FDI from OECD countries, South-South FDI flows are also 
positively correlated to the unit value of exports.  
Econometric studies such as the above face problems of endogeneity (e.g. is there a causal 
relationship between Chinese investments or are Chinese investments simply attracted to 
higher productivity environments), appropriate parameterisation and control variables as well 
data quality more generally. Yet, survey evidence confirms that the operations of Chinese 
firms facilitate technology transfer. In a survey with over 250 Chinese overseas enterprises 
(36% SOEs, 63% POEs), of which 27% invest in Africa, 87% said they have transferred 
technologies or have technology cooperation with host countries (UNDP, SASAC, & 
MOFCOM, 2015, p. 57). Some 51% of firms transfer technology to their own subsidiaries, 
17% transfer technology to other developing countries, 16% engage in the transfer of 
complete sets of equipment (i.e. turn-key projects) and 8% have some form of technological 
exchange with developed countries (Graph 5). Similarly, 77% of the contractors for 
construction projects said they will recommend the host countries to adopt their own or 
China’s engineering quality standards if they are higher than the host country’s standards 
(UNDP et al., 2015). As 46% of the interviewed enterprises in construction industry invest in 
15 
 
Africa (UNDP et al., 2015, p. 29), this will help to raise the technological standards and 
management skills of host countries. Other examples of technology transfer from Chinese 
firms include the Rwandan case where the government has negotiated technological 
upgrading and transfer of expertise with ZTE and Huawei, as part of the broader government 
strategy to enhance the country’s ICT sector (Gu & Carty, 2014). Brautigam (2008) also 
gives an example of Chinese trading networks having spurred a small boom in the production 
of spare auto parts in the Nigerian town of Nnewi.  
Spill-over effects can also be observed in terms of skill formation. For instance, evidence 
from Angola also suggests skill-development: the number of semi-skilled workers such as 
brick layers and masons on Chinese construction projects increases (Corkin, 2011; for more 
detailed evidence see Cheng, Oya, & Wolf, forthcoming). 
Graph 5. Forms of technology transfer during companies' investment and cooperation 
overseas (UNDP et al., 2015, pp. 56–57) 
 
Remaining problems in terms of linkage formation and the role of policy 
Despite observed spill-over effects in terms of knowledge and technology transfer and the 
market-seeking long-term oriented nature of Chinese FDI to SSA, problems remain. In 
particular, the same survey evidence as discussed above suggests that only 31% of the 250 
companies believe the spill-over effect is significant, only 51% believe it has brought some 
benefits to the locals and 17% do not think there is any improvement to the local technologies 
and management. This could be due to “technology mismatches and language barriers, and 
the limited capacity of companies and industries in host countries to assimilate the 
technologies being transferred, which is especially pronounced in less developed countries.” 
(UNDP et al., 2015, p. 58).  
In fact, Chinese firms operating in light manufacturing processing industries such as textiles, 
tannery and wood processing have also indicated being attracted by the availability of 
agricultural raw materials (Shen, 2015, p. 96). But existing evidence suggest that localised 
procurement remains sluggish. While 72% of the companies state that they prefer to source 
local products only 38% actually have the host country as their main procurement channel 
(UNDP et al., 2015). This is in line with the findings of Corkin (2011) and Gu (2011).  
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The reasons include unfamiliarity with the host market, cultural and language differences, 
and lack of experience in transnational operations and management, but also the availability 
and quality of domestic supplies (UNDP et al., 2015). The lack of supply capacities on the 
African side leads Chinese firms to turn to the established, reliable and cost-competitive 
suppliers in China (Gu, 2011). Sluggish linkage formation is an issue even for more long-
term oriented investments. In Tanzania, for instance, the China JD group so far has not 
sourced fabrics domestically, even though Tanzania is one of the few African countries which 
still has a substantial textile production sector (X. Tang, 2014). 
A World Bank report titled China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving 
Global Context by W. Tang and Pigato (2015) echoes the same problems with regard to 
linkage formation. They find that the SSA firms “are not positioning themselves within 
China’s value chains, which limits the impact of Chinese investment on economic 
transformation and export diversification in SSA” (W. Tang & Pigato, 2015, p. 4). This can 
be due to numerous reasons including “the small size of many economies in SSA, the low 
capacity of critical public institutions, the absence of complementary private markets, 
bottlenecks in essential infrastructure, and the lack of regional integration, all of which can 
make the establishment of large economies of scale very difficult to achieve.” (W. Tang & 
Pigato, 2015, p. 4). 
In certain sectors, linkage formation to the domestic economy is also weak because of the 
specific business models of Chinese firms. Chinese firms in the commodities sector, for 
instance, have greater access to “patient capital” (due to higher savings rates and support by 
the government) and could thus be expected to participate actively in the lengthy process of 
local linkage development. In reality, however, Chinese commodities firms form fewer 
linkages than their Western counterparts. Partially, this is because they are more reluctant to 
outsource parts of their non-core activities. Also, contrary to Western multinationals in the 
commodities sector, they have no local supply chain development programmes. Entry 
barriers may be lower in the case of Chinese supply chains, but exit is more frequent and no 
support is provided on the part of the Chinese lead firms (Morris, Kaplinsky, & Kaplan, 
2011). 
However, the findings of UNDP et al. (2015) also indicate that the proportion of procurement 
from host countries increases with the investment scale, i.e. 20% for an investment scale of 
less than USD 1 million, 38% for USD 5 – 10 million and 49% for over USD 50 million. The 
percentage is also higher for firms with more than 10 years of overseas experience (UNDP et 
al. 2015, 58).  
2. CHINESE FDI IN ANGOLA: RESOURCE COLONIALISM? 
Angola is one of China’s main partners in Africa, not just in terms of FDI but also in terms of 
trade volumes and Chinese construction projects (Cheng & Wolf, forthcoming; Wolf, 
forthcoming). These growing economic ties between China and Angola raise criticism in 
academic circles, in particular because China is seen to practice resource colonialism and 
undermine Western efforts to promote transparency and improve governance structures. 
Other than the lack of human capital, the quality of institutions is seen as one of the main 
structural deficiencies of the Angolan economy (da Rocha, 2011: 140f). This harks back to 
resource curse arguments, where the effective management of natural resources is only 
possible in the presence of good institutions, yet the presence of natural resources itself 
diminishes the quality of institutions (Wiig & Kolstad, 2012). China is seen to aggravate this 
catch-22 problem by way of increasing the government’s revenues from oil and by increasing 
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Angola’s ability to resist pressures of Western donors for reform (Hodges, 2011: 109; 
Malaquias, 2007: 235f; Malaquias, 2012: 36; Fernandes, 2012: 80; Croese, 2012: 126; 
Kibble, 2006: 528) 
While there is evidence that Chinese credit lines serve the Angolan elites to consolidate their 
own position of power (see Corkin, 2013: 139f on the subversion of CIF funds), there is no 
evidence that economic engagement with China hampers diversification in Angola. On the 
contrary, Chinese construction projects play an important role in the emergence of building 
materials manufacturing (S.-K. Cheng & Wolf, forthcoming) and Chinese investment is not 
merely focussed on resource extraction but also serves to strengthen manufacturing sector 
development. 
2.1. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
Data on FDI in Angola can be obtained based on the out-stocks/-flows reported by the major 
investors in Angola and based on the inflows reported by the Angolan central bank (BNA). 
Discrepancies between the two data sources reflect wider methodological problems in the 
collection of FDI data explored in section in section 1.1. In addition, the former national 
investment authority ANIP (replaced in 2015 by the Agência para a Promoção do 
Investimento e Exportações de Angola, APIEX) provides data on approved investment 
projects, domestic and foreign, exceeding a certain threshold. ANIP specific limitations are 
that ANIP data exclude most oil investment, since these are made under the terms of the 
production sharing agreements. For the year 2007 ANIP only recorded investments exceeding 
$50 million.  
Bearing in mind that ANIP data do not provide information on FDI as such but on approved 
domestic and foreign investment projects, they provide the most detailed source of 
information regarding the sectoral and geographical composition of non-mining sector 
investment projects.  
To facilitate the analysis of the ANIP data base, investments have been grouped 
geographically based on the income level of the investor using World Bank definitions, i.e. 
high income countries (HIC), BRICS, low income and upper middle income countries (LICs 
and UMIs). In addition, following the definition of Hines & Rice (1994), a category of tax 
havens of all income levels was created.  
The sectoral composition of ANIP data follows the broad categories defined by ISIC rev.3 
(A-Q). For the years 2011 and 2012 a four digit disaggregation of investments is available. 
For manufacturing sector investments, these have been regrouped into broad categories by 
approximation of economic end-use following the methodology used by Wolf (forthcoming) 
as follows: “Food and Beverages”4, “Final Consumption Goods”5, “Intermediate Inputs”6 
and “Machinery”7.  
2.2. SITUATING THE MAGNITUDE OF CHINESE FDI IN ANGOLA 
Data sources and discrepancies. Table 5 shows Angolan FDI stocks derived from data on 
out-socks reported by the partner countries and in-stocks reported by the Angolan Central 
Bank. What stands out is the huge discrepancy of the totals derived from the out-stocks 
                                                 
4 ISIC (rev. 3) codes 1511 to 1600 
5 1721 to 1920 and 2211 to 2230 and 3210 to and 3410 to 3699 + 3330 + 2893 + 2930 +3150 
6 2010 to 2109 + 2310 to 2899 + 3130+ 3420 + 3430 + 3210 + 1533+ 1711 + 1911 
7 2911 to 3190 + 3313 + 3320 + 2813 
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reported by the sub-sample of partners and the totals derived from the central bank data. 
Since 2010, the BNA reports huge negative inflows (divestments), which cumulate to 
negative stocks in 2013. This is inconsistent with the out-stocks reported by all the major 
investors, which sum up to USD 25 billion in 2012. The share of Chinese FDI stocks is 
therefore practically impossible to establish given the uncertain denominator. The totals 
based on the out-stocks derive from a subsample of investors only and the totals reported by 
the BNA are likely to understate total FDI stocks given the lack of information on reinvested 
earnings. What we see, however, is that Chinese FDI stocks grow more quickly than those 
reported by the other major investors, reaching levels reported by the US in 2012. 
Table 5. Angola FDI stocks by data source and partner (USD million) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total based on instocks reported by BNA 16,299 15,405 17,084 19,290 16,063 13,039 6,141 
Total based on reported outstocks 8,842 11,848 13,691 15,686 21,233 25,102 25,747 
 
France 1,379 5,922 4,686 5,937 7,296 7,961 9,067 
 
Norway 5,091 2,999 2,919 4,145 5,030 6,349 7,306 
 
Portugal 709 977 2,945 2,452 3,461 4,285 5,220 
 
China 37 78 69 196 352 401 1,245 
 
United States 1,540 1,633 2,645 2,540 4,460 5,473 1,245 
 
Brazil 22 73 107 124 67 125 1,175 
 
Other***  63 165 320 293 567 508 489 
China % of BNA reported inflows 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 1.0% 2.2% 3.1% 20.3% 
China % of total reported outstocks 0.4% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% 1.7% 1.6% 4.8% 
***Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, South Korea, South Africa 
Data Source: UNCTAD bilateral FDI statistics for outstocks; UNCTAD FDI statistics for instocks 
Table 6 compares FDI inflows to Angola based on central bank data and outflows to Angola 
reported by the major foreign investors as well as investment projects approved by ANIP. All 
data sources confirm that China is a major investor in Angola. Chinese FDI constitutes the 
third largest source of inflows in 2012 and China ranks 8th in terms of cumulative value of 
investment project approved by ANIP over the period 2003-2013. Chinese investment 
projects reported by ANIP are almost always lower than FDI outflows reported by China 
which might be explained by legal structures in Angola counting some foreign firms as 
Angolan, some investments being counted as coming from tax havens, and the absence of 
most mining investments in the ANIP data. 
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Table 6.  Angola FDI and foreign investment projects by data source (current USD mil.) 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Totals based on BNA -1,304 -38 -893 1,679 2,205 -3,227 -3,024 -6,898 -7,120 
Totals based on reported outflows  974 1,300 -383 505 -1,025 3,856 2,212 1,941 
 France 678 694 694 519 -478 1,511 979 953 
 Portugal 192 246 -1,051 -965 -512 208 524 530 
 China 0 22 41 -10 8 101 73 392 
 Other*  104 338 -68 961 -43 2,035 638 65 
 Total foreign projects (ANIP)** 2,443 529 287 807 1,174 2,074 262 1,104 2,815 
Cayman Islands 2,140 0 0 0 0 2 30 0 0 
Portugal 45 192 0 334 555 219 136 489 79 
Italy 5 6 0 1 1 9 1 0 2,095 
British Virgin Islands 25 69 120 28 43 496 3 2 204 
Netherlands 22 6 0 3 6 668 0 106 128 
South Africa 25 23 0 11 19 308 4 55 41 
China 18 9 0 39 164 79 50 45 76 
Spain 1 6 0 11 8 13 5 297 6 
Brazil 58 24 0 45 109 8 1 0 6 
Bermuda 0 0 0 208 0 0 0 0 5 
Gibraltar 26 4 167 0 0 1 0 0 0 
* Italy, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, South Korea, Luxemburg, USA, Sweden, Belgium) 
** top 10 based on cumulative value of approved investment projects 
 
ANIP data illustrate some broad trends in terms of the geographical distribution of 
investment outside the oil sector. Firstly, the volume of reported investment projects 
increases rapidly. Foreign investment projects increase from USD 268 million in 2003 to 
USD 1.5 billion in 2013 (in constant 2005 prices), though with large fluctuations (see Graph 
6) – marked in particular, by the global financial crisis and a single large-scale investment in 
2005. 
Secondly, investment projects are dominated by investments from high income countries 
accounting for more than 45% of total foreign investment projects in most years, with the 
important exception of 2005. In that year, one single investment of more than USD 2 billion 
from the Cayman Islands in the construction sector made up 87% of total investment projects. 
Investment from the BRICS countries picked up in the mid-2000s when it accounted for more 
than 26% of total reported foreign investment projects in 2006, but then slowed down again 
in relative terms over the last two years, accounting for only 4% of total investment projects 
in 2013.  
Thirdly, Angolan domestic investment increased from USD 41 million in 2003 to USD 781 
million in 2013. On the whole, it appears to be less volatile and – as indicated by the trend 
lines of domestic and foreign investment in Graph 6 – it also shows a much stronger upwards 
trend than investment from other sources, even though it still remains below foreign 
investment projects in absolute terms (see Graph 6).  
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Graph 6. Angola – FDI by country and Domestic Investment 2003 – 2013 (constant 2005 
USD) 
 
2.3. SITUATING THE SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF CHINESE FDI IN ANGOLA 
Overall sectoral distribution of investments by partner. After Angolan domestic investment, 
the second largest share of manufacturing sector investment comes from high income 
countries (37% of total manufacturing investment, nearly half of which come from Portugal 
alone). Investments from high income countries dominate particularly in extractive industries 
(72% of total investments in that sector) as well as financial services and real estate activities 
(59% of total investments in that sector). Investments from tax havens are concentrated in 
manufacturing and construction, with 15% and 69% respectively – through the large share of 
the construction sector is mainly driven by the one big investment from the Cayman Islands 
of USD 2 billion in 2005 (see Graph 7). Investments from BRICS are comparatively small 
and more geared towards manufacturing and construction, which account for 22% and 33% 
of total BRICS investments respectively. 
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Graph 7. Angola – Investment by Sector and Country (cumulative 2003-2013, constant 2005 
USD) 
 
Details of the sectoral distribution of Chinese investments. Looking specifically into 
Chinese FDI, we see that absolute volumes of investment are very small. Even FDI in the 
construction sector, which accounts for 81% of total Chinese FDI over the period 2003 to 
2013 is smaller in absolute terms than Angolan domestic investment in that sector. 
Manufacturing sector investments are the second largest component of Chinese FDI, but with 
a cumulative value of USD 55 million over the period 2003 to 2013, these pale compared to 
domestic and Portuguese investment volumes. 
Table 7. Chinese Investments in Angola by Sector and Year (constant 2005 USD, million) 
Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
 Agriculture and Fish. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 6 1.2% 
Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0.4% 
Manufacturing 9 0 9 2 0 2 8 6 9 1 9 55 9.9% 
Construction 9 0 5 8 0 42 221 81 19 28 38 450 81.2% 
Wholesale, Retail, 
Tourism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 0 6 16 2.8% 
Transport 0 0 5 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 9 1.7% 
Finance, Real Estate 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3 4 13 2.3% 
Public Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0.5% 
Total 18 0 20 12 0 45 232 95 35 37 59 554 100% 
Agência Nacional para o Investimento Privado 
 
Details of the manufacturing sector investments by partner. For the years 2011 and 2012, 
ANIP provides a sub-sectoral breakdown of investment following the ISIC rev. 3 
classification at the 4 digit level, which shows that the majority of manufacturing sector 
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investments have been made in the production of intermediate inputs, followed by food and 
beverage, as well as machinery production. The majority of investments in the production of 
intermediate inputs were carried out by Angolan nationals. Investments from HICs focus on 
food and beverage production and make up for the second largest share of total investments, 
despite the overall depressed levels of Portuguese investments over these two years (Table 8).  
Table 8. Manufacturing Sector Investments 2011 and 2012 by Broad Category 
(constant 2005 USD, thousands) 
Broad category ANG 
HIC 
(excl. 
PRT) PRT CHN TAX 
LICs, 
LMIs, 
UMIs Total 
Food + Beverages 34,201 157,442 3,230 259 2,573 2,814 200,520 
Intermediate Inputs 612,318 897 5,889 551 2,913 9,369 631,937 
Machinery 29,481 2,225 173 5,766 0 0 37,644 
Final consumption 3,963 144 288 3,270 17,551 0 25,217 
Medical equipment 0 2,452 0 0 0 0 2,452 
Recycling 0 0 0 0 2,305 2,205 4,509 
Total 679,963 163,160 9,580 9,846 25,342 14,387 902,279 
Source: Agência Nacional para o Investimento Privado 
Despite these nominally small numbers, Chinese investment have played a major role in the 
emergence of the two main manufacturing sector activities in Angola. Chinese dominated 
construction activities have created a market for building materials, which facilitated the 
emergence of the cement industry in Angola (S.-K. Cheng & Wolf, forthcoming). In addition, 
the Hong-Kong based China International Fund (CIF) Luanda operates the largest Angolan 
cement plant with an installed capacity of 3.6Mta at Bom Jesus (i.e. 41% of installed capacity 
in the cement sector) (S.-K. Cheng & Wolf, forthcoming). 
Disaggregation of investments in food and beverage production shows that, in 2011 and 
2012, investments came mainly from high income countries, and the majority of these was 
for the production of alcoholic beverages (beer and spirits). The beverage market in Angola is 
dominated by European and South African multinationals and some domestic producers, such 
as the Angolan market leader in soft-drinks Refriango. The largest beer producers are owned 
by the French beverage giant Group BGI (Castel) producing the local brands Cuca, Nokal 
and Eka, as well as the South-African SAB Miller and the Portuguese Unicer. However, there 
are also substantial Chinese investments in this sector: the CIF financed Lowenda Brewery 
emerges as a major player producing about 10% of domestic beer output in 2013 and 
employs 250 Angolan and 170 expatriate workers (MIND, 2014). 
Though no specific research exists on the investment motives of Chinese manufacturing firms 
in Angola, firm-level accounts from the beverage sector suggest that foreign investments are 
attracted by growing consumer demand in Angola itself. Two examples from the alcoholic 
beverages industry illustrate how localised production is a strategy used by firms to expand 
sales in the growing Angolan consumer market. 
Distell, a South African producer of spirits wines and ciders, which had previously invested 
USD 3.05 million in Angola in 2008 (according to ANIP data, constant 2005 USD) has 
opened further plants in Angola in 2014 following the sharp rise in import tariffs on food and 
beverages, which, according to Distell’s CEO make exports to Angola less profitable relative 
to setting up production there.  
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“An import model – paying excise and transport costs – can never be as effective or efficient from a 
pricing standpoint than a locally-owned production and route-to-market business,” (R. Rushton, CEO 
of Distell, cited in Maritz, 2014) 
Thus, it is the rise in import tariffs and a potentially fast growing consumer market rather 
than trade liberalisation that motivate Distell to relocate production to Angola. 
Diageo, the British multinational producer of brands such as Guinness and Johnnie Walker, 
has, according to ANIP data, invested USD 1.1 million (in 2005 constant terms) in 2012 to 
improve its wholesale activities in Angola and is now considering setting up production 
facilities in the country. Internal company reports consider Angola a key new market, with 
Angolan beer consumption per head being at two thirds of UK levels, thereby making it the 
largest African market for beer and the third largest African market for alcohol (Diageo, 
2013). 
The car assembly plant CSG Automóveis is considered another Chinese model investment in 
Angola, producing 32,000 vehicles a year and employing over 600 workers (of which 500 
Angolan).8 
3. CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN ETHIOPIA: THE GEESE FLYING TO 
AFRICA? 
Different data sources on Chinese investment suggest that China is the most important 
foreign investor in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is often seen as emblematic for the onset of a flying-
geese type relocation of labour-intensive industries from China to Africa. This is true, but 
Chinese investment motives in Ethiopia are much wider than benefitting from cheap labour 
costs, and investments are predominantly market-seeking. This offers a wider potential for 
structural transformation on the back of economic engagement with China. Ethiopian policy 
has actively shaped the relationship with China, which explains, for instance, the success of 
(parts of ) the leather industry despite of Chinese competition. Yet, some policy mismatches 
impede domestic linkage formation.  
3.1. ETHIOPIAN INVESTMENT TRENDS AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF 
CHINESE INVESTMENT 
Ethiopia is not a typical FDI attracting country. As for Angola, data on FDI provided by the 
Ethiopian Central Bank (NBE) and the outstocks reported by the main investors differ 
greatly. Instocks reported by the NBE are significantly larger than totals derived from the 
outstocks of main investors (Table 9). This might be explained by the fact that reported 
outstocks cover only a sub-sample of investors. However, there are likely to be other sources 
of discrepancy given the gap between the two.  
                                                 
8  http://www.noticiasautomotivas.com.br/angola-vai-ter-sua-primeira-montadora-de-automoveis-e-a-previsao-e-
de-32-mil-unidades-por-ano/  
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Table 9. Ethiopia FDI stocks by data source and partner (USD million) 
  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total instocks reported by NBE 3,366 3,588 3,697 3,918 4,206 4,833 5,111 
Totals based on outstocks by reporters 99 268 330 522 610 673 660 
 
China 96 109 126 283 368 427 607 
 
Turkey 0 6 11 28 21 23 36 
 
United States 2 2 2 3 6 9 11 
 
Other* 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
China % of total NBE 96.1% 40.7% 38.4% 54.3% 60.3% 63.4% 91.9% 
China % of total outstocks reported 2.8% 3.0% 3.4% 7.2% 8.8% 8.8% 11.9% 
* Belgium, India, Italy, South Korea and Norway 
Source: UNCTAD bilateral FDI statistics 
In 2013, China’s flows to FDI to Ethiopia is USD 102 million, China’s total FDI stocks 
amount to USD 772 million (calculations based on Statistical Bulletin of Chinese outward 
FDI). What stands out is that Chinese FDI stocks in Ethiopia are much larger than any of the 
other major investors (see Table 9). This is consistent with the data from the Ethiopian 
Investment Commission (EIC), which show that China is the lead investor for the largest 
number of projects (1016) recorded between 2000 and 2015, followed by India (479), Sudan 
(433), the US (369) and the UK (288). Consequently, China is also the largest employment 
generator, with 285,123 jobs created by Chinese investment projects over the period 2000 to 
2015. This is followed by the UK (215,141) and Saudi Arabia (237,138). Interestingly, 
although Chinese investment projects generate the most employment in absolute terms, they 
seem to be less labour intensive than UK-led projects, which generate more employment per 
project on average. Data by the EIC are very detailed in that they indicate all investors in case 
of joint ventures. What stands out, is that China engages less in joint ventures than OECD 
investors (Table 10). 
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Table 10. Ethiopia: Investment Projects by Region 2000-2015 
Region 
No. of Investment 
Projects of which JV % JV 
Total Employment 
Generated 
BRICS 1553 326 21% 426,548 
 
China 1016 146 14% 285,123 
 
India 479 145 30% 132,718 
OECD 2020 957 47% 720,152 
 
USA 369 132 36% 80,969 
 
UK 288 154 53% 215,141 
SSA 606 140 23% 100,593 
 
Sudan 433 58 13% 71,446 
 
Kenya 73 34 47% 13,481 
MENA 668 265 40% 295,720 
 
Saudi Arab. 212 103 49% 237,138 
 
Egypt 84 39 46% 12,487 
Asia 105 29 28% 25,123 
Latin Am. 45 19 42% 5,792 
Europe (non-OECD) 33 19 58% 22,692 
       
 
Total no. of 
projects 5030 
 
Total Employment 
Generated: 1,596,620 
Source: EIC 
3.2. INVESTMENT MOTIVES AND SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF CHINESE FIRMS 
IN ETHIOPIA 
Even in Ethiopia, often presented as a model case for flying-geese type relocations of 
Chinese labour intensive industries (Geiger & Goh, 2012), survey data of the Ethiopian 
Central Statistical Agency (CSA) suggest that about 84% of Chinese manufacturing firms in 
Ethiopia are local market-seekers (Seyoum, Wu, & Yang, 2015; Geda and Meskel, 2010). 
The two most frequently mentioned investment motives of the 45 Chinese manufacturing 
firms in Ethiopia interviewed by Geiger & Goh (2012) are the ‘good understanding of the 
investment climate (from social networks)’ and the ‘local market in Ethiopia’. ‘To take 
advantage of cheap labour in Ethiopia’ is ranked on average ‘neither agree nor disagree’ 
among Chinese manufacturing firms, though Chinese firms in the service sector ‘strongly 
agree’ (Geiger & Goh, 2012). In addition, Chinese FDI is different from the others as most of 
the Chinese investment is in green field, compared to, for example the locally-dominant 
Saudi-owned MIDROC group and others who are more interested in purchasing public 
enterprises and acquisition of privatized firms (Geda & Meskel, 2010, 23-4).  
Out of the 69 Chinese companies interviewed in the World Bank’s report, 45 (65%) are in 
manufacturing (including textile, garments/shoes, non-metallic minerals, machinery and 
equipment supplies, information technology, electronics, food/restaurants) and only 13 are in 
construction (Geiger & Goh, 2012). This reflects the sectoral distribution of Chinese 
investment projects reported by the EIC. Over the period 1999 to 2015, the Ethiopian 
investment commission has registered a total of 694 Chinese projects in manufacturing. By 
contrast, the US, i.e. the largest OECD investor, has undertaken just 88 manufacturing sector 
investment projects over the same period. About 68% of Chinese-led investment projects are 
manufacturing sector investments, compared to 34% of OECD country-led investments, and 
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40% of SSA-led investments. In particular, we find a stronger concentration of Chinese 
investments in final consumer goods production and intermediate inputs (Table 11). 
Table 11. Ethiopia: investment projects by sector and country (% of total by investor) 
Sector BRICS China OECD SSA MENA Asia 
Latin 
America 
Europe (non-
OECD) 
Agricult., Forest., Fishing 7% 1% 17% 10% 22% 8% 13% 18% 
Mining 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
         
Food & Beverages 6% 5% 10% 17% 17% 20% 24% 21% 
Final Consumer Prod. 21% 27% 8% 6% 8% 25% 7% 0% 
Intermediate Inputs 31% 32% 12% 14% 17% 17% 9% 27% 
Machinery 4% 4% 2% 1% 1% 2% 0% 0% 
Medical Precision 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Public Transport 
Equipment 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Luxury 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
         
Services 30% 30% 50% 50% 33% 28% 47% 33% 
Source: EIC 
The areas of investment have become increasingly diversified which involve both POEs and 
SOEs, e.g. the traditional resource extraction in iron and steel, the new light industry, 
manufacturing in glass production and automobile assembly, construction of SEZ and 
industrial park (Li, 2014). Zooming further into the type of Chinese manufacturing sector 
investment shows that these are very diverse, covering a total of 78 sub-sectors at the 4-digit 
level and involving a whole range of activities. To put this into perspective, US 
manufacturing investments only cover 42 sectors. Textiles, garments and footwear production 
dominate in Chinese investments, but we also find plastic products, cement and concrete 
articles, steel and furniture among the top ten manufacturing investment sectors. The largest 
employment generators are textile, garments and footwear projects, but plastics and cement 
projects are also large employment generators (Table 12). 
Table 12 Ethiopia: Chinese manufacturing sector investments 2000-2015 by ISIC 4 digit 
ISIC 
4digit Description 
No. of 
Investment 
projects 
Empl. 
generat
ed 
% of 
total 
empl. 
2520 Plastics products 65 10,750 9% 
1721 Made-up textile articles, except apparel 49 5,147 4% 
1810 Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 42 15,213 12% 
3610 Furniture 40 1,931 2% 
1920 Footwear 28 12,062 10% 
2695 Articles of concrete, cement and plaster 26 2,128 2% 
2694 Cement, lime and plaster 25 10,716 9% 
3220 Television + radio, telephones 23 1,963 2% 
1912 Luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness 21 14,852 12% 
2710 Basic iron and steel 19 2,163 2% 
1511 Processing of meat and meat products 17 1,760 1% 
1711 Spinning of textile fibres; weaving of textiles 17 9,206 7% 
2021 Veneer sheets; plywood, laminboard and other panels  15 2,160 2% 
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Table 12 Ethiopia: Chinese manufacturing sector investments 2000-2015 by ISIC 4 digit 
ISIC 
4digit Description 
No. of 
Investment 
projects 
Empl. 
generat
ed 
% of 
total 
empl. 
2693 Structural non-refractory clay and ceramic products 15 1,489 1% 
2811 Structural metal products 15 2,609 2% 
3430 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles  12 808 1% 
3699 Other manufacturing n.e.c. 11 1,305 1% 
2109 Other articles of paper and paperboard 11 1,418 1% 
1554 Soft drinks; production of mineral waters 10 1,121 1% 
1911 Tanning and dressing of leather 10 5,156 4% 
2610 Glass and glass products 10 1,706 1% 
1514 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 9 529 0% 
2422 Paints, varnishes, printing ink and mastics 9 238 0% 
2519 Other rubber products 9 645 1% 
2924 Machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 9 330 0% 
1730 Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 8 1,355 1% 
2424 Soap and detergents, perfumes and toilet preparations 8 331 0% 
3410 Motor vehicles 8 1,015 1% 
3592 Bicycles and invalid carriages 8 209 0% 
2899 Other fabricated metal products n.e.c. 8 792 1% 
2696 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 7 842 1% 
2930 Domestic appliances n.e.c. 6 478 0% 
3150 Electric lamps and lighting equipment 6 425 0% 
3591 Motorcycles 6 601 0% 
2731 Casting of iron and steel 6 2,260 2% 
3130 Insulated wire and cable 6 1,797 1% 
2921 Agricultural and forestry machinery 6 298 0% 
3190 Other electrical equipment n.e.c. 6 140 0% 
1544 
Macaroni, noodles, couscous + similar farinaceous 
products 5 418 0% 
2101 Pulp, paper and paperboard 5 223 0% 
2429 Pther chemical products n.e.c. 5 200 0% 
2915 Lifting and handling equipment 5 256 0% 
2411 
Basic chemicals, except fertilizers + nitrogen 
compounds 4 167 0% 
3140 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 4 980 1% 
1712 Finishing of textiles 3 432 0% 
1729 Other textiles n.e.c. 3 85 0% 
2893 Cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 3 179 0% 
1549 Other food products n.e.c. 3 91 0% 
2320 Refined petroleum products 3 598 0% 
2720 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 3 421 0% 
3230 Television + radio receivers, sound or video recording 2 80 0% 
1531 Grain mill products 2 65 0% 
1532 Starches and starch products 2 350 0% 
1541 Bakery products 2 200 0% 
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Table 12 Ethiopia: Chinese manufacturing sector investments 2000-2015 by ISIC 4 digit 
ISIC 
4digit Description 
No. of 
Investment 
projects 
Empl. 
generat
ed 
% of 
total 
empl. 
1542 Sugar 2 65 0% 
2010 Sawmilling and planing of wood 2 225 0% 
2102 
Corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of 
paper and paperboard 2 420 0% 
2511 
Rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and rebuilding of 
rubber tyres 2 92 0% 
3210 
Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components 2 95 0% 
3420 Bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles 2 140 0% 
3110 Electric motors, generators and transformers 2 56 0% 
1722 Carpets and rugs 1 1,000 1% 
1723 Cordage, rope, twine and netting 1 120 0% 
1513 Preserving of fruit and vegetables 1 12 0% 
1520 Dairy products 1 20 0% 
1543 Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 1 35 0% 
2029 
Other products of wood; articles of cork, straw and 
plaiting materials 1 70 0% 
2412 Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 1 100 0% 
2421 Pesticides and other agro-chemical products 1 30 0% 
2430 Man-made fibres 1 11 0% 
2691 Non-structural non-refractory ceramic ware 1 50 0% 
2692 Refractory ceramic products 1 22 0% 
2699 Other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 1 90 0% 
2812 Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal 1 60 0% 
2919 Other general purpose machinery 1 80 0% 
2925 Machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing 1 10 0% 
3313 Industrial process control equipment 1 183 0% 
3320 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 1 13 0% 
 
Total 691 125,692 100% 
 
Source: ECI  
Chinese investors in Ethiopia are also diverse in terms of ownership structures: large and 
medium-sized SOEs, joint-stock enterprises, individual and private SMEs. To name a few, 
ZTE (formerly Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment) Corporation, China Sinohydro 
Corporation, China Wanbao Engineering Company, China Gezhouba Water Conservancy, 
Huajian Shoe Factory (Li, 2014). 
3.3. SPILL-OVER EFFECTS FROM CHINESE FDI IN ETHIOPIA 
Seyoum et al. (2015) find that Chinese FDI in Ethiopia is positively correlated to domestic 
firms’ productivity when the technology gap is small. Small firms and non-exporting firms 
benefit more from spill-over effects than do other types of domestic firms. 
Geda and Meskel’s research (Geda & Meskel, 2010) showed  strong performance in Ethio-
Chinese relation in the following areas from 2005 to 2009: road construction, supply of 
manufactured goods from China, telecommunication and installation of big electric power 
29 
 
stations by Chinese companies, and Chinese firms’ involvement in the Ethiopian 
manufacturing sector. Their survey (about 50 targeted companies each for Chinese firms and 
domestic firms) showed that the majority of both Chinese firms and domestic firms perceive 
Chinese investment to have a positive impact in Ethiopia. These impacts are not based on 
empirical analysis but on perception of the targeted firm managers. The results therefore have 
to be taken with some caution particularly for the self-assessment of the Chinese firms.  
3.4. POLICY MEDIATION OF CHINESE INVESTMENT IN ETHIOPIA: SUCCESSES 
AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 
Ethiopia has been widely discussed as a case of China outcompeting local manufactures. 
Survey evidence by Gebre-Egziabher (2009) reveals that out of the 98 small and medium 
enterprises in the Ethiopian footwear industry, 60 per cent were forced to close or to 
rationalize their activity because of Chinese competition (Gebre-Egziabher, 2009). 
However, Sonobe, Akoten, & Otsuka (2009) show that those enterprises that survived the 
Chinese competition are now growing dynamically and serving both local and international 
markets. The interesting question is which policies facilitated this bounce back and 
explanations for this success vary. Sonobe et al (2009) underline that Chinese competition 
had spurred a process of creative destruction with domestic SMEs having to improve product 
quality and production processes, thereby increasing their export capacity and leading other 
local firms to enter the market. This in turn led to cluster building and supply-side 
externalities including improvements in technology and managerial capabilities. Brautigam, 
on the other hand, attributes the rebound of the Ethiopian leather industry to a successful 
policy response by the Zenawi government, which set-up industrial parks (and within that 
large factories) and encouraged learning spill-overs from joint ventures (among others with 
Chinese firms) (Brautigam, 2009).  
Limited supply chain formation might be partially a temporary phenomenon explained by 
unfamiliarity with local suppliers, but it also reflects policy mismatches in the host country. 
In Ethiopia, for instance, both Chinese shoe manufacturers and tanneries have set up 
production bases. Yet Chinese tannery firms are reluctant to supply Chinese shoe 
manufactures in Ethiopia because they would lose their tax benefits if products were sold 
domestically instead of being exported (Brautigam & Tang, 2014). 
4. CHINA’S “GO GLOBAL” – A STUDY OF FDI AND INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY 
For Chinese enterprises to be able to “Go Global” means to successfully upgrade and 
compete internationally, and the Chinese experience itself is a very useful case for studying 
the relation of FDI and industrialisation. While many believe that inflow FDI is the key for 
Chinese economic transformation, the reality is more complicated. 
FDI for industrialisation and modernisation? 
Like many low- and middle-income countries which rely on the foreign industrial goods and 
machinery for industrialisation and modernisation, China is no exception. When the 
international blockade was eased in 1978, China increased imports dramatically and bought 
goods ranging from arms, aircraft, steel-making plants, petrochemicals, mining equipment, 
oil rigs to wheat (H.-S. Cheng, 1979). The import commitments saw a tenfold increase from 
the previous year and quickly changed China’s trade surplus to trade deficit. Including 
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committments under negotiation, the total import bill came up to about USD 60 billion in 
1978 whereas the exchange reserves at the time were only between USD 2 billion and USD 4 
billion (H.-S. Cheng, 1979). Prior to the SOE reform in the 1990s, many of the SOEs were in 
debt and had to rely on state support. 
Ten years before Zhu’s speech on “Go Global”, in 1991, a State Planning Commission paper 
endorsed by the State Council entitled Strengthening Administration on Overseas Investment 
Projects recognized that Chinese enterprises had not obtained the capability to conduct large-
scale overseas investment, and that overseas projects using large amounts of foreign currency 
had to be examined and approved by the state.  
Since the Market Reforms which open China for inward FDI, China has successfully 
accumulated a large reserve of foreign exchange. By the end of 2010, China had nearly USD 
2.65 trillion and is growing by as much as USD 500 billion a year (Salidjanova, 2011, 14). 
Although FDI inflows as a percentage of China’s GDP stood at around 4% to 6% from 1990s 
to 2000s, higher than the world average, China’s GDP growth has actually outgrown the 
growth of FDI inflows (Naughton, 2006, 405). Foreign capital is not the main engine of 
growth in China. As noted by Naughton, China had restricted incoming FDI to the export 
manufacturing sector up until 1990. The domestic market was effectively closed to foreign 
firms with only a few exceptions (Naughton, 2006, 403). Even after 1990, FDI was 
concentrated in the coastal provinces and could not account for the general growth across the 
country. As suggested by Bramall (2009, 276), the talk of export-led growth may apply to 
Guangdong but not in provinces such as Zhejiang or Jiangsu where domestic factors were 
critical. Furthermore, exports of goods and services as percentage of GDP in China hit nearly 
36% in 2006 and then dropped (World Bank, 2016). Only between 2002 and 2008 did the 
export share in China excee the world average. But compared to the average of the 
developing countries in East Asia and Pacific, the percentage in China remained below the 
average in the region (World Bank, 2016).  
Preferential treatment is given to foreign capital to attract investment in export manufacturing 
with the aim to induce technology transfer and structural upgrade. On the other hand, a 
national policy on creating a group of “national champions” is gearing up at the same time. 
Some scholars name it the “dual-track” reforms – effectively cordoned off “strategic parts of 
the domestic economy from the processing trade regime’s outputs and imported inputs” 
(Poon, 2014, 9).  
China’s industrial policy with the state sector taking the lead  
Although “Go Global” is not exclusive to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the strategy design 
and the timing worked hugely in favour of the SOEs, particularly in the beginning. Chinese 
SOEs have been subject to waves of reform and restructuring,  including the corporatization 
and privatization of some small- and medium-sized SOEs. This has led to massive lay-offs of 
workers and an emerging private sector in the Chinese economy. However, the reforms do 
not men the government is giving up the state sector. It actually includes an ambitious plan to 
turn the fortunes of the selected SOEs in strategic industries, and to make them competitive 
and leaders in these industries.  
Some 120 large enterprise groups were selected by the State Council in the 1990s to create a 
“national team” under preferential policies. These policies could be roughly grouped into 
three categories: 1) High levels of tariff and non-tariff protection. For example, the average 
level of tariffs was almost 25% in 1999, on vehicle imports it was 80-100%, and 31%on farm 
products. There were mandated technological transfers for certain categories of imported 
goods, and the state bureaucracy matched domestic component suppliers with foreign 
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investors, routinely excluded foreign firms from domestic distribution channels, and required 
foreign investors to set up joint ventures with selected domestic partners; 2) Enhanced legal 
rights on fundamental areas such as profit retention, investment decisions and engagement in 
international trade. SOEs were given the right to set up internal finance vehicles, and to 
manage companies within the same SOE group. Many state-run R&D centres were 
transferred to these companies. The 1994 Company Law enshrined their property rights as 
independent legal entities formally separate from the bureaucracy. The top 120 led the move 
to domestic and international stock market listings, the latter tightly controlled by the state as 
a key mechanism for raising capital; 3) Large-scale state financial support. The big four state 
banks concentrated their funds in support of the national team and the process of 
concentration. A simplified loan procedure was put in place in the late 1990s, and hundreds 
of dedicated bank branches were set up to advise the top 120 and facilitate access to capital 
markets. Billions in loans have been made to facilitate the expansion and export of key 
sectors (Nolan 2001, 18-19).  
The result of the SOEs reform was transformative: the overwhelming majority of the 
“national team” ceased to be loss-making and became profitable concerns. In 2006, Premier 
Wen Jiabao reported to the 11th National People’s Congress that compared to 2002, the 
SOEs’ total profits increased by 223% and their tax contribution by 105%. The largest SOEs, 
now well-integrated, fully-financed and viable businesses, were now ready to compete on the 
international stage (Xinhua 2008). The relative success of the industrial policy is reflected in 
the structural changes to China’s export basket: China is exporting higher value-added 
manufactures such as electrical, computers, and telecommunications equipment, and 
domestic contents in the exports are increasing (Poon, 2014, pp. 5–6). The proportion of 
assembly operations in the processing trade balance dropped from over 30 percent in the late 
1990s to about 10 percent in 2006 (Poon, 2014, p. 6). China has also advanced into “core 
product markets of developed countries – such as in heavy equipment manufacturing like 
construction machinery and other capital equipment sectors – and taking market share at the 
expense of western companies in non-OECD markets. Moreover, a BCG [Boston Consulting 
Group] report surveyed seven large-equipment industries (photovoltaic, wireless telecom, 
wind power, coal power, power transmissions, railing rolling stock, and civilian aerospace) 
and noted that all except one (civilian aerospace) have at least one Chinese company among 
the top five global players”(Poon, 2013, p. 4).  
China’s success in industrial policy and lessons for SSA economies 
If China did not have an independent industrial policy and had not developed its indigenous 
technological capabilities, it could have remained a large assembly hub and its processing 
trade could be completely susceptible to foreign capital, technology and market. Okazaki & 
Fukumoto’s study of China after the global financial crisis in 2008 shows that the net inward 
direct investment dropped by 47 percent in 2009 according to the balance of payments 
statistics published by SAFE; the foreign banks had withdrawn USD 10.4 billion direct 
investment from Chinese banks (Okazaki & Fukumoto, 2011, p. 13). This could be 
catastrophic to any economy which relies on foreign investments and markets. China was 
able to recover quickly largely due to government intervention and the successful 
implementation of the stimulus plan through the state controlled banking sector and SOEs. 
“In the first quarter of 2009, the net increase of bank loans amounted to 4.6 trillion RMB, 
which was nearly the equivalent of that for the whole year of 2008. Medium- and long-term 
loans made up 41 percent of the total loans. This was because the banks followed the 
government’s guidance to support infrastructure investment and technological innovation. 
The increase in infrastructure loans constituted 50 percent of the total medium- and long-term 
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loan increases. Such a rapid increase in infrastructure loans helped the economy to recover 
quickly.”(Okazaki & Fukumoto, 2011, p. 18) The stimulus plan not only increased 
investment, it has also furthered the industrial upgrading of domestic firms in a variety of 
sectors and increased the market share of some of the top domestic producers (see examples 
in Poon, 2014, pp. 12, 18).  
As suggested by (Lo, forthcoming), productivity growth and industrial upgrading might be 
the more important driving forces in China’s expansion of international trade. The state plan 
and strategy to create a “national team” and the selective opening to foreign capital were the 
measures used to protect the domestic industries and reduce dependency. The relative success 
of China’s industrial policy serves as a reference point for the developing countries. As 
Daniel Poon (2014) points out, China’s own experience has, against the Washington 
Consensus, carved out policy spaces for industrial policy and should encourage others to 
pursue an alternative strategy for development. China’s relative success in upgrading – the 
ability to build up indigenous technological capabilities – has substantially lowered the prices 
of vital capital goods. As quoted in Poon’s (2014, p. 20) report, the OECD commented that 
“such a downward shift in the relative price of capital goods could represent a major growth 
payoff from the expansion of India and China for the world economy as a whole, but 
especially for low-income countries where prices for capital goods have historically been 
excessively high”. China’s growing investments in developing countries should also give the 
latter increased bargaining power with other bilateral partners. With China’s strategic 
concerns in mind, these developing countries can better position themselves and leverage for 
more technology transfer and capacity building assistance.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Existing evidence shows that Chinese firms are willing to incur short-term losses in order to 
become more cost-effective or to penetrate the domestic consumer market. This engagement 
offers opportunities for SSA countries through spill-over effects in terms of linkage formation 
and skill development. Whether they are made use of depends as much on the domestic 
dynamics in African countries as on the mode of Chinese engagement. China’s “Go Global” 
experience has demonstrated that inflow FDI is important for host countries in accumulating 
foreign reserves and technology transfer, but that FDI alone cannot guarantee growth and 
industrialisation. For a developing country to achieve economic transformation and 
industrialisation it takes much more than just attracting FDI.  
Chinese investments in Africa are mainly in construction, mining and manufacturing. Our 
studies show that it has generated some positive impact in the two cases examined here– 
Angola and Ethiopia. The positive impact on SSA countries also depends on the extent and 
pace of China “deepening its industrial capabilities and diversifying into productive sectors 
and activities up the industrial value chain” (Poon 2014, p.2). China’s structural 
transformation and its ramifications are welcomed but should be analysed with caution given 
the fact that China is still a developing country itself and has been under tremendous pressure 
to roll back government investment and move towards financialisation. While it is certain that 
some ground work for economic development has been laid by Chinese investment, it is too 
early to say whether it will bring structural change to these countries.   
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